Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Act by unknown
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 5 Article 5 
1967 
Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Act 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1967) "Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Act," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 19 : Iss. 5 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss5/5 
This Symposium Paper is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more 
information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
ARTICLE 9 AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
I. GNERAL CONFLIr IN PURPOSES
The fundamental theory undergirding the concept of insol-
vency proceedings and application of the Federal Bankruptcy
Act' may best be summarized as an attempt to equalize the credi-
tors of the insolvent debtor. The basis of such a theory lies in
the belief that it serves a broad and equitable interest in regulat-
ing the "carving up" of a debtor after his solvency is gone. The
Bankruptcy Act, in its effort to effectuate this purpose of equal-
izing the distribution of assets to creditors, establishes regulatory
barriers about the bankrupt to prevent one or several creditors
from gaining advantage over others less alert.
The central figure in the scheme of equalization is the trustee
in bankruptcy, who stands as the representative of all unsecured
creditors and not merely as the alter ego of the bankrupt. As to
all property of the bankrupt on the date of bankruptcy 2 the trus-
tee is vested with all the rights, remedies and powers of a credi-
tor holding a judicial lien on the property ;3 therefore, he stands
under the act ahead of any unperfected security interest. As such
an ideal lien creditor, the trustee is empowered to avoid judicial
liens obtained within four months of bankruptcy, or to preserve
them for the benefit of the bankrupt estate.4 In delineated in-
stances, the act provides for postponement, restriction or invali-
dation of non-possessory statutory liens on personal property.5
It provides for the setting aside of fraudulent transfers made
within one year of bankruptcy,( or for longer periods of time if
applicable state law so requires.7 Among the most formidable
and important of the trustee's powers lies in his ability to vacate
preferential transfers from the bankrupt's property which are
perfected within four months of bankruptcy." The trustee may
reject executory contracts, 9 and the act limits the amount of
provable damages resulting from the rejection of unexpired
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1964).
2. Date of bankruptcy refers to the date on which the petition is filed. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 1(13), 11 U.S.C. § 1(13) (1964).
3. Id. § 70(c), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(c) (Supp. 1966).
4. Id. § 67(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1964).
5. Id. § 67(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c).
6. Id. § 67(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d).
7. Id. § 70(e), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e).
8. Id. § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96.
9. Id. § 70(b), 11 U.S.C. § 110(b).
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leaseholds.10 Post bankruptcy interest is not generally provable
as part of a claim, 1 and the act proscribes or limits penalties or
forfeitures on debts owing to either the United States or any
state.12
Despite the thrust of its objective, the Bankruptcy Act has
not achieved a total leveling process among creditors, and not
all creditors are rendered equal in fact. Within the act itself
priorities among claiming creditors are created,'3 and further
provisions establish or provide for perfection of statutory liens.1
4
Provisions such as the latter two inject a degree of imbalance
into the equation of creditors concept, but little doubt exists that
the trustee and the bankruptcy courts are imbued with the au-
thority to effectuate what is within the contemplation of the
Bankrupcy Act a just and fair distribution to creditors.15
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,'8 rather than
lumping all creditors together in a non-differentiated class,
creates or permits the creation of security interests in personal
property, thereby creating the preferred or secured creditor. At
the very foundation of the article is the validation and strength-
ening of the position of the secured creditor as against all other
interests.
This enactment supersedes all previous state legislation dealing
with such security devices as chattel mortgages, conditional sales,
trust receipts, factor's liens, and assignments of accounts receiv-
ables. The commendable objective of Article 9 is to replace di-
verse technicalities with simplified and uniform rules, with a
view towards more efficient and economical operation of today's
immense variety of secured financing transactions. As a con-
comitant of this objective, the general paramountcy of secured
over non-secured lenders has been established.
The basic premise upon which Article 9 is founded runs in-
herently contrary to the undergirding principles of proceedings
in federal bankruptcy; therefore, conflicts are inevitable and
problems in application will be increasingly surfaced during the
"formative years" of Article 9 development. There exists a built-
10. Id. § 63(a) (9), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (9).
11. Except where a consensual lien is adequately secured. Id. § 63(a) (1), 11
U.S.C. § 103(a) (1).
12. Id. § 57(j), 11 U.S.C. § 93(j).
13. Id. § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104.
14. Id. §§ 67(b), 67(c), 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(b), 107(c).
15. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
16. S.C. CODE Axx. §§ 10.9-101 to 10.9-507 (1966).
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in potential for conflict. The trustee in bankruptcy, as repre-
sentative of all unsecured creditors claiming an interest in the
bankrupt estate, is both empowered and obligated to accumulate
for distribution as much in assets as possible. On the other hand,
Article 9, as bastion for the insolvent's secured creditors, must
withstand the trustee's vigorous assaults. In many instances the
confrontation will not merely arise as a conflict of laws, but will
represent a clash in underlying philosophies.
II. THE UCC, THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE PRE-EM PTION
DocTRWm'
As has been noted, the basic philosophies represented by the
Federal Bankruptcy Act and the Code are antagonistic. For this
reason there are understandably specific provisions of the two
separate bodies of law which will, at best, find accommodation
with the other difficult. Particularly during the formative
years of Uniform Commercial Code interpretation in conjunction
with bankruptcy proceedings, the concept variously referred to
as "paramountcy," "supremacy" or "pre-emption" will be of
much interest. The Constitution of the United States' 7 estab-
lishes in Congress the "power to ... establish ... uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
In response to this mandate Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Act;"8 therefore, its provisions must be regarded as paramount
to any state law on the subject.'"
Section 1-10320 of the Code, an element of state law, provides
that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,
the principles of law and equity, including ... the law relative
to . . . bankruptcy ... shall supplement its provisions."21 This
statement notwithstanding, as an increment of state law, any
provision of the Code found to be in conflict with the operation
of the Bankruptcy Act must be deemed subordinate to its
terms.2 2 In considering the validity of a state insolvency statute
in International Shoe Company V. Pinus,23 the Supreme Court
17. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
18. 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
19. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931); Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U.S.
288, 298 (1914) ; In re Crosstown Motors, 272 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1959).
20. S.C. CODE AbN. § 10.1-103 (1966).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Swartz, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on Secured Financ-
ing Transactions and Bankruptcy, 38 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 50, 60 (1963).
23, 278 U.S. 261 (1928).
[Vol. 19
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determined that "a State is without power to make or enforce any
law governing bankruptcies that ... conflicts with the national
bankruptcy laws,"24 and that "states may not pass or enforce
laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act.12
It has been abundantly illustrated, through the Constitutional
directive giving rise to enactment of the Bankruptcy Act and
the interpretation of that act, that any uniform system of laws
regulating bankruptcies must be enacted by Congress. Hammond
v. Lyon Realty Company, 2 extended the pre-emption concept by
holding that "not only those state laws which purport to cover
the whole field of insolvency administration are superseded by
the national bankruptcy law, but all other state laws to the extent
that they hamper or restrict its proper operation. 2 7 In applying
this principle, the courts have consistently voided partial provi-
sions of state statutes which are in conflict with federal bank-
ruptcy legislation.
28
Invalidation of provisions of state enactments occurs only
where they appear to be in real conflict with the "bankruptcy
purposes" of the Bankruptcy Act. Exemplary of this require-
ment of a real conflict in purpose is Kesler v. Department of
Public Safety.2 9  Significant to the present consideration is
the Supreme Court's language that the purpose of the con-
tested state statute "is wholly unrelated to the considerations
which propelled Congress to enact a national bankruptcy law,"30
"is wholly unrelated to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act,"81
and "the bearing of the statute on the purposes served by bank-
ruptcy legislation is essentially tangential.
1 2
24. Id. at 263-64.
25. Id. at 265 (emphasis added). This statement has been followed or recog-
nized in subsequent decisions, e.g., In re Prudence Co., 79 F2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.
1935) ; Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 59 F2d 592 (4th Cir. 1932).
26. 59 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1932).
27. Id. at 595.
28. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943)
(Louisiana statute postponed administration expenses and wage claims in bank-
ruptcy in favor of certain local tax liens) ; It re Prudence, 79 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.
1935) (New York statute exempted a certain class of corporations from bank-
ruptcy proceedings from which they were not exempted under the Bankruptcy
Act); Appling v. Brueckner, 97 Cal. App. 750, 275 P. 382 (1929) (California
statute allowed payment of preferences in violation of Bankruptcy Act) ; In re
Mills, 76 F. Supp. 764 (D. Va. 1948); Public Finance Corp. v. Londeree, 200
Va. 607, 106 S.E2d 760 (1959) (Virginia statute restricted presentation of
certain evidence in bankruptcy proceedings).
29. 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
30. Id. at 171.
31. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 174.
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The Uniform Commercial Code is not essentially directed to-
ward the general regulation of insolvency proceedings; there-
fore, it should not fall within the prohibition enunciated in
Pinkus. It is not so certain, however, that various provisions of
the Code to the extent that they may affect bankruptcy, will not
fall within the ambit of Hammond. Of course a determination
of the precise extent to which provisions of the Code are in con-
flict with the purposes of the national bankruptcy law will in
many instances only be clear after judicial interpretation.
The first confrontation of Article 9 with the Bankruptcy Act,
under other than hypothetical circumstances, occurred in the
Referee's hearing in In re Portland Pubishing Company.33 The
Referee here avoided a direct ruling on supremacy and the deci-
sion was not dispositive of any substantive conflict between the
conflicting bodies of law. The Referee's decision was hotly con-
tested by the proponents of the Uniform Commercial Code
because it seemed to indicate that in federal bankruptcy courts,
a cool reception awaited Code provisions such as section 9-108
which modify traditional bankruptcy law concepts. However,
the Referee's view did not prevail in the Oregon District Court.
That court held that a valid security interest in accounts receiv-
able, filed before the commencement of the 60(a) four month
period, which contemplates substitution of new accounts receiv-
able for released old accounts, does not amount to using an ante-
cedent debt for security, thus constituting a voidable preference.
The court has accepted the Code idea that a security interest in
revolving or flow type accounts receivable comes into existence
when the agreement is made and not in the future as the various
accounts contemplated come into existence. 84 Thus has the Code
successfully brought the "mountain to Mahomet".
I. TmE STRONG ARm CLAUSE
The structures and procedures required by Article 9 relative to
the perfection of security interests in personal property should
33. 3 U.C.C. Rept. Serv. 194 (D. Ore. 1966). This decision was overruled in
part by the full court in In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271
F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967). The opinion of Referee Snedecor is also printed
in full, with limited comments in 40 RFm. J. 28 (1966). See also Kennedy,
The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some
Problems Suggested By Articles 2 and 9, 14 Ruras L. RIv. 518, 547-49
(1960); Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Clallenge to After-Acquired
Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 PA. L. REv. 194, 220 (1959); Riemer,
Bankruptcy-Preferene-Coiflict Between Section 9-108 of Uniform Commer-
cial Code and Section 60(a) of Bankruptcy Act, 70 Com. L.J. 63, 66 (1965).
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serve to alleviate some of the controversies which have plagued
courts in interpreting the "strong arm provision"385 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. At the heart of the problem is a confusing history
of determinations surrounding the precise extent of the trustee's
powers as a lien creditor.
Section 70(c) states:
The trustee may have the benefit of all defenses available to
the bankrupt .... The trustee shall have as of the date of
bankruptcy the rights and powers of: (1) a creditor who
obtained a judgment against the bankrupt upon the date of
bankruptcy, whether or not such a creditor exists, (2) a
creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained an exe-
cution returned unsatisfied against the bankrupt, whether
or not such a creditor exists, and (3) a creditor who upon
the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable
proceedings upon all property.., upon which a creditor of
the bankrupt upon a simple contract could have obtained
such a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists. If a trans-
fer is valid in part against creditors whose rights and powers
are conferred upon the trustee under this subdivision, it
shall be valid to a like extent against the trustee. In cases
where repugnancy or inconsistency exists with reference to
the rights and powers in this subdivision conferred, the
trustee may elect which rights and powers to exercise with
reference to a particular party, a particular remedy, or a
particular transaction, without prejudice to his right to
maintain a different position with reference to a different
party, a different remedy, or a different transaction.8"
The foundation of the strong arm provision has resided in the
Bankruptcy Act since its earliest enactment;87 however, the sec-
tion has undergone significant change during the course of its
interpretative development. The most recent of these changes
was directed toward increased discretion and power in the
trustee.38
In 1931, the venerable Justice Holmes made no reference to the
then existing counterpart of section 70(c) when he wrote for a
35. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(c) (Supp. 1966).
36. Id., as amended, Pub. Law 89-495 (July, 1966).
37. Bankruptcy Act § 70, 30 Stat. 565-66 (1898).
38. Pub. L. No. 89-495 (July, 1966). See Kennedy, The Bankrnptcy Amend-
ments of 1966, 41 REF. J. 53 (Apr. 1967) ; Paskay, Congress Amends National
Bankruptcy Act, 72 Com. L.J. 31, 33 (1967).
1967]
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unanimous Court in Moore v. Bay.39 It has been suggested, how-
ever, that if that decision-often criticized for its brevity and
ambiguity40-had been carefully explained to encompass its nat-
ural limits, consideration both could and should have been given
the strong arm provision, thereby alleviating much subsequent
controversy as to its proper consequences.41 In Moore v. Bay, a
mortgage which had been executed without recordation of inten-
tion was denied priority over creditors who extended credit after
recordation, and the transaction was held wholly voidable by
the trustee in bankruptcy. The importance of the decision lies
in the directive that the trustee avoids the mortgage entirely and
not merely to the extent of the prefiling claims. However, Gil-
more suggests that the decision should have expressly stated
that, (1) the trustee acquires the rights of all prefiling creditors
under section 70(e), and (2) the trustee has the status of a lien
creditor under the strong arm provision.
42
Although the Court in Moore v. Bay avoided a logical oppor-
tunity to shed interpretative light upon the relationship between
the section 70(e) and 70(c) provisions, a federal district judge
sought to establish the meaning of the strong arm clause in
In re Waynesloro Motor Company.43 Under the state law ap-
plied through section 70 (e), the trustee clearly had authority to
regard a number of repossessed automobiles as part of the bank-
rupt dealer's inventory. In classic style, however, the judge
attributed the authority of the trustee to the strong arm clause:
[T]he trustee in bankruptcy . . . stands here as the ideal
creditor, irreproachable and without notice, armed cap-a-pie
with every right and power which is conferred by the law
of the state upon its most favored creditor who has acquired
a lien by legal or equitable proceedings.4 4
The confusion concerning application of the strong arm provi-
sion and the extent of the trustee's power are illustrated by the
foregoing cases. In more recent considerations, neither less furor
nor more certainty has come out of decisions in which the courts
39. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
40. J. MACLACHLAN, BANKMUPTCY § 284 (1956).
41. 2 G. GILiom, SECURITY INTERESTs IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.3.2, at
1293 (1965).
42. Id.
43. 60 F.2d 668 (S.D. Miss. 1932).
44. Ird. at 669. This language is quoted and discussed in 2 G. Gilmore, mepra
note 41, at 1293.
[Vol. 19
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have pondered filing rules similar to that encountered in Moore
V. Bay.4
5
In Constance v. Harvey 6 it was found that the trustee's ideal
lien creditor status makes no difference for purposes of avoid-
ance of a mortgage. The ideal creditor was one who had extended
credit before the mortgage was filed; therefore, section 70(c)
rights were to be measured by the rights of such a creditor even
though no such creditor existed as of the date of bankruptcy.
Application of this interpretation was generally criticized 47 and
followed only within the Second Circuit.48
The Supreme Court overruled Constance by its consideration
of essentially the same filing rule in Lewis v. Manufacturers Na-
tional Bank. 49 In enunciating the fallacy of the Constance con-
struction of section 70(c), the Court stated that such a reading
"would give the trustee power to set aside transactions which no
creditor could avoid and which injured no creditor."50 The Court
refused to countenance such an unjustifiable windfall to unse-
cured creditors simply by reason of the debtor's bankruptcy.
The Lewis court intimated that while the trustee's powers may
not be dependent upon, or linked to, the rights of existing credi-
tors in all sections of the Bankruptcy Act, they are so linked
under the strong arm clause.
In Pacific Finance Corporation v. Edwards5' a most literal
interpretation of the "spirit" of the Lewis decision was adopted
and a conditional sales contract filed late was deemed void as to
subsequent creditors. The question posed by the court was
whether or not section 70(c) vests in the trustee as of the date
of bankruptcy the rights and powers of a lien creditor, whether
or not such a creditor actually exists, in the absence of a creditor
45. The rule was first considered in Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E.
1073 (1893).
46. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
47. See, e.g., MacLachlan, Two Wrongs Make a Right, 37 TExAs L. REv.
676 (1959); Marsh, Constance v. Harvey-The "Strong-Arm Clause" Re-
Evaluated, 43 CAsiF. L. REv. 65 (1955); Weintraub, Levin & Beldock, The
Strong-Arm Clause Strikes the Belated Chattel Mortgage, 25 FORDHAm L. REv.
261 (1956).
48. Conti v. Volper, 229 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1956). Cf., England v. Sanderson,
236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956) (theory of Constance followed in limiting an
exemption allowable in bankruptcy). The Constance opinion has been expressly
rejected in some cases, e.g., In re Alikasovich, 275 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1960);
In re Billings, 170 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Mo. 1959).
49. 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
50. Id. at 608-09.
51. 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962).
1967]
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who could have obtained a lien at the date of bankruptcy.5 2 The
court considered carefully the language of the strong arm clause
and answered the question in the negative. Section 70(c) applies
only where there is property "upon which a creditor of the bank-
rupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings
at the date of bankruptcy."5  "Creditor" here was held to
mean an actual creditor. The remaining language of the section
itself was relied on to buttress the "actual creditor" construction.
The court found that the phrase "whether or not such a creditor
actually exists" refers only to a "creditor then holding a lien
thereon.1
5 4
Under this construction the trustee is empowered to exercise
the powers given him even if no actual creditor has obtained a
lien, but he cannot do so if no actual creditor could have obtained
a lien. In the factual circumstances of Pacific Finance, no actual
creditor existed; consequently, the trustee could not acquire the
status of a hypothetical lien creditor. The period of time during
which a creditor who is able to attack the transaction might have
come into existence is extended to the date of bankruptcy. The
court equated this situation with that in Lewis, in which no
creditor able to attack came into existence during the time of
non-recordation of the chattel mortgage.55
The Washington rule before the Pacific Finance court repre-
sents an inverse reflection of the rules of Moore '. Bay, Con-
stance and Lewis. In these latter three cases, delayed filing ren-
dered a chattel mortgage voidable by pre-filing creditors;
whereas, in Pacific Finance delayed filing made a conditional
sale voidable by subsequent creditors.
In the view of one highly regarded authority, the Pacific
Finance decision represents the conclusion that Moore v. Bay
would have reached if that opinion had been expanded to its
natural bounds: "§ 70(c) merely supplements § 70(e) by con-
ferring lien status on the trustee in his representation of existing
52. Id. at 228.
53. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(c) (Supp. 1966).
54. Pacific Finance Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir. 1962).
55. The Pacific Finance decision has stirred conflicting opinions among com-
mentators in the fields of bankruptcy and commercial law. For a critical view
of the decision, see King, Pacific Finance Corporation v. Edwards: Another
Misreading of Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 38 REP. J. 56 (1964). For
a rebuttal to Professor King's criticism, see Wiley, In Defense of Pacific Fi-
nance Corp. v. Edwards, 38 REF. J. 117 (1964) and for a reply argument, see
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or actual creditors if applicable state law provides that only lien
creditors can avoid the challenged transaction.""0
The extension of section 70(c) powers and rights which were
suggested by Constance and denied by Lewis and Pacific Finance
could not have arisen under Article 9 of the Code.
Section 9-301(1) (b) provides that an unperfected security
interest is subordinate to the rights of "a person who becomes a
lien creditor without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected." 57 Once an Article 9 security interest has
been perfected, regardless of delays which may have occurred
in perfecting, no class of creditors, prior or subsequent, can avoid
the security interest by acquiring a lien on the collateral.
If perfection of the security interest is delayed and the peti-
tion in bankruptcy is filed before perfection occurs, the referee
can avoid the security interest. After bankruptcy there will
necessarily be actual creditors whom the trustee represents under
section 70(e), and as representative, the trustee will have the
status of a lien creditor under section 70 (c). With the status of
lien creditor the trustee is empowered to avoid any unperfected
security interest under section 9-301 (1) (b). The only actual
creditor who could avoid the security interest would be one who
both acquired a lien before perfection and was without knowl-
edge. Arguably, if Article 9 were considered alone, the trustee
could not prevail if it could be shown that all creditors did have
knowledge of an existing unperfected security interest in the
collateral.58 With knowledge of the unperfected interest no
creditor could have acquired a valid interest even if he had
acquired a lien.
If Lewis and Pacific Finance were construed to mean that the
trustee, under section 70(c), prevails only where he stands as
representative of a creditor who could have avoided the security
interest by acquiring a lien, it should logically follow that the
trustee must find at least one creditor without knowledge if he
is to avoid an unperfected security interest under Article 9."5
Such a creditor without knowledge here would be similar to a
pre-filing creditor in Lewis or a subsequent creditor in Pacific
Finance. However, though this may be a logical deduction, it is
not an accurate representation of bankruptcy law today.
56. 2 G. GILmoRE, mipra note 41, § 45.32, at 1295.
57. S.C. CODE AN. § 10.9-301(1) (b) (1966).
58. 2 G. GiLmORE, stpra note 41, § 45.3.2, at 1296.
59. But see, id.
1967]
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Section 9-301(3)60 provides the Code's definition of a lien
creditor and designates creditors' representatives in insolvency
proceedings as lien creditors within the meaning of Article 9.
This section provides:
Unless all the creditors represented had knowledge of the
security interest such a representative of creditors is a lien
creditor without knowledge even though he personally has
knowledge of the security interest.61
This section implies that the knowledge of the creditors, if all
creditors had knowledge, is imputed to their representative. The
language and intention of this section will undoubtedly be appli-
cable to receivers or creditors' assignees in state proceedings,
but it is not so clear that the literal language of the section will
be strictly construed as it applies to the trustee in bankruptcy.
The federal bankruptcy concept, establishing the trustee as an
ideal, hypothetical lien creditor, "irreproachable and without
notice,"6 2 is probably strong enough to shield the trustee from
the necessity of proving that he represents at least one creditor
without knowledge of the security interest.
There is one caveat to the general proposition that an unper-
fected security interest can always be avoided by the trustee in
bankruptcy. For most purposes the date of filing of a petition
in bankruptcy occasions a "freezing" of property interests in the
bankrupt's assets. Where state law has provided a grace period
for filing, however, the courts have allowed a relation back
against the trustee. The doctrine of relation back becomes opera-
tive after the date of bankruptcy only where a security interest
is placed on record before expiration of the allowable grace
period.
3
Most Article 9 security interests are deemed perfected at the
time that the requisite "act of perfection" takes place (usually,
recordation or possession).64
The perfection is without relation back to an earlier date.
Section 9-301(2),65 however, with respect to purchase money
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-301(3) (1966).
61. Id.
62. In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932).
63. See cases and commentary, COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFOR11 COMMERCIAL CODE § 10.03 (1967). But see,
HANNA & MAcLACHLAN, CREDITORS' IGHTS & REORGANIZATION 758-65 (5th
ed. 1957).
64. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-305 (1966). When a security interest is per-
fected by taking possession, there is no relation back to any earlier date.
65. Id. § 10.9-301(2).
[Vol. 19
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security interests, provides a ten day grace period for filing.
Under this provision, the secured party is given ten days to file,
subsequent to the debtor's possession date. If he files within the
grace period, he takes priority over the claims of any creditors
who acquire liens between the time of attachment of his security
interest and his filing date.
The section 9-301(2) grace period is analogous to the pre-code
grace periods which have existed in many states. It is reasonable
that the relation back problem under the purchase money se-
curity interest provision will be treated as before and will
operate against the referee in bankruptcy in the same way as it
operates against other creditors.66
IV. THm TUSTEE IN THE SHOES oF ACTUAL CIxnrroRs
The long criticized opinion of Moore v. Bay67 has already been
considered in the initial treatment of the interpretation of the
status of a section 70(c) lien creditor. Over the years the real
substantive disruption caused by the decision has arisen more
often in consideration of the trustee in bankruptcy under section
70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act.68
While section 70(c) has been referred to as the "strong arm"
clause in bankruptcy, section 70(e) could properly be labeled
its "long arm" clause. The applicable provision states:
A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a
debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this title which, under
any Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent
as against or voidable for any other reason by any creditor
of the debtor, having a claim provable under this title, shall
be null and void as against the trustee of such debtor.69
Based upon a construction of this language the doctrine of
Moore v. Bay is essentially that where a transfer may only be
vulnerable in part in the ordinary course of events, it becomes
totally invalid in the extraordinary event of bankruptcy. This
rule becomes operative only where the security interest of a
creditor is vulnerable to attack by invocation of some applicable
state law governing the transaction." Whether the attack to be
66. See, COOGAN, supra note 63, § 10.03.
67. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
68. Bankruptcy Act § 70(e), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964).
69. Id.
70. Lytle v. Andrews, 34 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1929); Rockmore v. Schilling,
72 F. Supp. 172 (D.N.J. 1945), afJ'd, 167 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1948); Glasser v.
Rogers, 53 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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made upon the security interest is successful or not is deferred
by the Bankruptcy Act to an interpretation of state law and the
relevant rights of actual creditors. If the state law insulates the
secured creditor from attacks by the bankrupt's other creditors,
the security interest is likewise immune to attack by the trustee
in bankruptcy because section 70(e) confers upon him only the
standing afforded an actual creditor. The trustee, however, is
not merely subrogated to the rights and powers of the actual
creditors having provable claims. Under Moore v. Bay the trus-
tee rises above the avoiding capabilities of the actual creditors;
he can avoid in toto whereas they avoid pro tanto. But he is
helpless under section 70(e) unless the actual creditors have at
least a power of partial defeasance.
The situation in which the doctrine of Moore v. Bay operates
arises under the type of state statute designed to protect the
interests of interim creditors.
The fundamental purpose of a statute requiring the filing
of chattel mortgages is protection of creditors, as well as
subsequent purchasers of mortgages, who deal with the mort-
gagor upon the assumption that the property in his posses-
sion is unencumbered. . . . The "creditors" referred to in
the statute have been held to be those who become such in
good faith and without notice, in the interim between exe-
cution and filing of the mortgage.
7 1
This type of statutory policy does not afford a creditor any
protection against one who extends credit to the debtor after
creation, but before perfection, of a security interest. The want
of some reasonable grace period in which to perform the routine
mechanics of perfection is not ordinarily unduly prejudicial to
the secured creditor. The interim creditor's claim is simply paid
off by the secured party. Where bankruptcy intervenes, however,
the cruel dimension of Moore v. Bay is surfaced. The interim
creditor, regardless of the size of his claim against the bankrupt,
can no longer simply be paid off, and his very existence com-
pletely destroys the security interest in favor of the trustee in
bankruptcy.
72
71. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Coller, 106 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1939).
72. E.g., Miller v. Sulmeyer, 263 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Exchange Bank
v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1955); American Trust Co. v. New York
Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, 207 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1953); Zamore v.
Goldblatt, 194 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1953); It re J. P. Corley Lumber Co., 115
F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1940); Friedman v. Sterling Refrigerator Co., 104 F.2d
837 (4th Cir. 1939).
[ ol. 19
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The harsh reality of just such a fortuitous circumstance is
graphically illustrated by Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kahn.73 A
chattel mortgage securing a note of $1,678 was executed on Octo-
ber 18, 1947 and recorded seven days later on October 25. The
debtor, during this one week interval between execution and
perfection, purchased a pair of shoes on credit. The price of the
shoes was $4.64. Under Missouri law the chattel mortgage was
void as to the shoe seller because unrecorded at the time of his
credit sale. Ordinarily, the mortgagee would simply take care
of the shoe claimant at the time of foreclosure, but the chattel
mortgagor went into bankruptcy in February, 1950, two and one-
half years after execution of the chattel mortgage. Under appli-
cation of the Moore v. Bay doctrine, the $1,678 mortgage was
in effect completely destroyed because of the $4.64 claim. The
mere existence of this potentially disastrous blow to a security
interest can have serious and disruptive consequences with regard
to secured financing transactions. 7 4
Neither meticulous care nor expensive precaution is adequate
protection in the shadow of Moore v. Bay. Absent simultaneous
creation and perfection of a security interest, the possibilities
are virtually endless for the establishment of a small interim
creditor.7 5 Applications of the doctrine run contrary to general
business practices and commercial reasonableness ;76 yet direct
abrogation of the doctrine of Moore v. Bay must lie either with
Congress or the bankruptcy courts, and political overtones have
stalled most efforts in behalf of such a frontal attack.7 7
Consistent with its overall attempt to solidify secured financ-
ing transactions in favor of the secured creditor, Article 9 has
taken aim at the doctrine enunciated in Moore v. Bay. Those who
sought to abolish it prior to the draft of Article 9 overlooked
the possibility of indirect attack through destruction at the state
level of the right of a simple interim creditor to prevail over an
unperfected security holder.
73. 203 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1953).
74. See, J. MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 40, § 285, at 334, n. 9.
75. E.g., In re Tobias, 150 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Mich. 1957) (chattel mort-
gage executed by restaurateur at 4 o'clock p.m. and recorded the following
morning was defeated because of the credit sale of a small quantity of ice cream
between 7 and 8 o'clock a.m. on the day of recordation).
76. See, e.g., Exchange Bank v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1955)
($7,500 mortgage avoided by the court's reliance on a rebuttable presumption,
contrary to fact, concerning the time within which filing took place) ; General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Coller, 106 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1939) (interim
creditors should not be subordinated to the procedural routine of any mortgage
over which they can have no control or knowledge).
77. J. MAcLACHLAN, supra, note 40, § 285, at 334.
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Sections 9-20178 and 9-30179 of the Code basically effect the
removal of the crutch whereby the trustee in bankruptcy assumes
the standing of an interim creditor; consequently, the Moore v.
Bay doctrine is severely blunted as a bankruptcy weapon.
Section 9-201 establishes the general validity of the security
interest subject only to the restrictions placed upon that validity
within the Code or specifically reserved to other laws or regula-
tions.8 0 Essentially, the security interest is effective and binds
all creditors of the debtor.
Under section 9-301, consideration is given to the types of third
parties and circumstances under which an unperfected security
interest may be defeated."' The unperfected security interest is
obviously subordinated to the claims of a perfected secured
creditor.8 2 Additionally, however, the unperfected creditor is
deferred to the interests of lien creditors who acquire liens with-
out knowledge of the security interest and before perfecting
8
and to the interest of certain purchasers not operating in the
ordinary course of business.8 4 Of particular emphasis here
should be the fact that in neither section has the unperfected
security interest been subordinated in any manner to the interest
of a simple interim creditor.
The net result of these provisions . . . is that an unper-
fected Security Interest is valid and enforceable against
rights of general, non lien creditors, and, with the exception
of the ten day period for purchase money Security Interests,
an unperfected Security Interest is subordinate to the rights
of all other third persons. 8,
Implementation of these provisions has in large measure steri-
lized the doctrine enunciated in Moore v. Bay. Some tangential
or marginal situations in which it may retain a degree of po-
tency have been suggested.8 6 Despite the potentiality of some
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-201 (1966).
79. Id. § 10.9-301.
80. See S. C. Reporter's Comments, S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-201 (1966).
81. See Id. § 10.9-301.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-301(1) (a) (1966).
83. Id. § 10.9-301(1) (b). Note also the 10 day grace period for filing a Pur-
chase Money Security Interest. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-301(2) (1966).
84. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.9-301(1) (c), -301(1)(d) (1966).
85. Ireton, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part II, 6 PER. FIN.
L.Q. 64? 67-68 (1962).
86. For examples of these areas in which the doctrine may still be operative,
see Hawkland, The Impact of the Commercial Code on the Doctrine of Moore
v. Bay, 67 Com. L.J. 359, 362 (1962) and Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform
Commercial Code on Insolvency: Article 9, 67 Com. L.J. 113, 117, n. 45 (1962).
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remaining vestige of life in these fringe areas, enactment of
Article 9 by the states effectively neutralizes the acid effect of
Moore v. Bay as a practical consideration in security financing.
A consideration of section 9-20587 is very relevant to any dis-
cussion of potential effects which Article 9 may have upon appli-
cation of section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act. Article 9
expressly validates the floating charge or lien on a shifting
stock.8 8 The objective of section 9-205 is to implement the estab-
lishment of this "arrangement for effective inventory financing
and the use of accounts receivable as collateral to secure working
capital advances by a revolving fund."
8 9
The most serious obstacle to this commercially sound objective
is the doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner-9 The rule, enunciated
there and through a long line of decisions, 91 holds a security
interest void as to third parties where the secured creditor per-
mits the debtor to exercise dominion over the security collateral
or proceeds from it. In Benedict, this doctrine was applied in
federal bankruptcy to invalidate an assignment of accounts
receivable. The debtor-bankrupt was given unfettered dominion
over collections against the assigned accounts and was under no
duty to account to the creditor-assignee. Mr. Justice Brandeis
concluded for the Court that such an uncontrolled security ar-
rangement was a sham and fraud under the applicable state law
as to other creditors. Under the Bankruptcy Act any such trans-
fer deemed fraudulent by the state law is voidable by the trustee
in bankruptcy.92
Lee v. State Bank & Trast Company93 is illustrative of the
extent to which the "dominion rule" has been applied against an
otherwise good security interest. There a pledge of accounts was
voided because the debtor-pledgor was allowed dominion over
goods which only represented approximately one per cent of the
total collateral. Despite the undesirable and burdensome com-
mercial effect visited upon secured creditors who required no
policing of the collateral under the terms of their security inter-
87. S.C. CODE AN. § 10.9-205 (1966).
88. See id. §§ 10.9-201 through 10.9-204 and accompanying S. C. Reporter's
Comments.
89. S.C. Reporter's Comments, S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-205 (1966).
90. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
91. See cases collected in Annot., 73 A.L.R. 236 (1931).
92. Bankruptcy Act § 70(e), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964).
93. 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930).
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A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against
creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use, comingle
or dispose of all or part of the collateral . . . or proceeds,
or by reason of the failure of the secured party to require
the debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral.95
The provision prohibits invalidation of a security interest as
fraudulent merely by reason of liberty in the debtor to exercise
dominion over the collateral without an accounting.96 This rep-
resents an express rejection of the Benedict rule.9 7
Although the matter of the dominion rule arises most fre-
quently in conjunction with federal bankruptcy proceedings, the
rule of Benedict v. Ratner is not itself a rule of federal bank-
ruptcy law.98 Section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act gives to the
trustee the rights of actual creditors as prescribed by state law.
Because this act reserves to state law the factual determination
of fraudulence in a security interest arrangement, the rule of
section 9-205 will have application in bankruptcy as well as in
the state courts.
94. See note 91 supra.
95. S.C. CODE AmN. § 10.9-205 (1966).
96. The basis of the rejection of the Benedict principle is that it is really a
credit matter and should not influence any determination of the essential validity
of the security arrangement. Business reasons may compel policing or account-
ing arrangements, as may be agreed upon between the lender and his debtor,
and this rejection of the Benedict rule does not prejudice continuation of such
"credit matters" between the parties.
97. South Carolina may not have accepted the prevailing view of the Benedict
doctrine and the rule of section 10.9-205 seems to be in accord with existing law
as expressed in Marshall v. Crawford, 45 S.C. 189, 22 S.E. 792 (1895) and
Porter v. Stricker, 44 S.C. 183, 21 S.E. 635 (1894).
98. Benedict v. Ratner purported to state the law of New York and is not a
rule of federal bankruptcy law. Therefore, no pre-emption problem exists and
the principle can be rejected as a matter of state law.
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